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Abstract
The construction of evaluation functions to compare alternatives in decision making
under uncertainty is the central focus of this work. The importance of the decision
makers’ attitude with respect to their view of the temperament of uncertainty is stressed
as a significant component in the formulation of these functions. Evaluation functions
are developed which allow for the inclusion of both probabilistic information as well as
attitudinal predilections held by the decision maker. Ó 1999 Elsevier Science Inc. All
rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Decision making in the face of uncertainty is a task that is manifest in many
of our activities. An important component in the human’s approach to decision
making under uncertainty is the attitude of the decision maker with respect to
uncertainty. By attitude we mean whether the decision maker is optimistic,
pessimist or somewhere in between with respect to their view of the disposition
of uncertainty. A closely related manifestation of decision attitude is the de-
cision makers nature with respect to their being conservative or adventurous in
the face of uncertainty. In the face of probabilistic uncertainty the most often
used technique for comparison between alternatives involves use of the ex-
pected value. What is often overlooked is the use of the expected value im-
plicitly implies a particular decision attitude, one midway between the
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optimistic and pessimistic attitude. In situations in which we have no infor-
mation regarding the decision makers attitude the use of the expected value
appears a very reasonable tool. However, as we move more into the realm of
intelligent technologies, where by intelligent technologies we often mean
technologies that try to include as much as possible the subtleties of the human
agent in the automated procedures, we must try to include in our systems a
more realistic representation of the decision maker’s attitude toward uncer-
tainty. Our focus in this work is to provide machinery to enable the inclusion of
decision making attitude in environments which use is also made of probabi-
listic information. The approach developed here will be based upon the
so-called decision making under ignorance method [1,2] and its recent gener-
alization and unification [3]. We recall that this method, which includes the
Maxi-Min and Maxi-Max approaches, is fundamentally based upon the use of
the decision attitude, however, it doesn’t include any consideration of proba-
bilistic information. Our goal is to include probabilistic decision making with
attitudinal decision making.
2. Decision making under uncertainty
The fundamental framework of the decision making under uncertainty
paradigm is captured by the following matrix (see Fig. 1).
In this matrix the Ai represent available courses of action. The decision
maker must choose one of these courses of action. The Sj represent the possible
states for some variable, denoted V, and called the state of nature, which is
used to represent all relevant attributes associated with the decision that are
not available at the time one must select the course of action. The Cij represent
the payo to the decision maker if they select action Ai and the value of the V
Fig. 1. Decision making under uncertainty paradigm.
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turns out to be Sj. We shall in this work assume that the Cij are numbers in the
unit interval. This framework can be seen as capturing the essential features of
decision making under uncertainty.
The methodology used for the solution of this problem has generally been
based upon the type of information that is known with respect to the value of
V. Classically [1,2] two distinct categories have been considered. The first
category, often called decision making under risk, assumes that we have some
probabilistic information with respect to the state of V. That is, it assumes
there exists a probability distribution over S {S1, S2, . . . ,Sn} such that
PjProb(VSj). The second category, often called decision making under
ignorance, assumes that we have no information with respect to the value of V
other then it is in the set S. Recently researchers [3–8], have with the aid of the
Dempster–Shafer theory, considered other situations with respect to the type of
information available about the state of V.
The selection of the best alternative in the case of probabilistic information,
decision making under risk, has been based upon the use of the expected value.
For each alternative Ai, calculate its expected payo, Ei where
Ei 
Xn
j1
PjCij:
We then select as our preferred alternative the one which has the highest
expected payo. It should be noted that this approach can be seen as using a
kind of weighted average of the payos available to Ai where the weights are
determined by the probability. In this perspective the probabilities can be seen
as importance weights.
In the case of decision making under ignorance, a dierent agenda is used.
In this situation the responsible decision maker is questioned as to their de-
cision making attitude. Once having obtained their decision making attitude, a
procedure is introduced to ascertain the appropriate course of action. Three
prototypical decision making attitudes have been used often in the literature
[1]. The first is called the pessimistic attitude. This attitude is characterized by a
fear of bad things happening, and uses a decision procedure, called the Maxi-
Min, that protects against the ramifications of the worst instantiation of V.
Using this pessimistic attitude we evaluate each alternative using
Bi MinjCij;
and then select the alternative with the largest Bi. In this case we see that we are
essentially following a decision imperative that looks for the worst thing that
can happen under each alternative and then it selects the alternative with the
best of these values, the best of the worst. It is a very conservative approach. At
the other extreme is the so-called optimist. This attitude is characterized by a
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belief that the best thing will happen once we make our selection. Using the
optimistic attitude we evaluate each alternative using
Di MaxjCij;
and then again select the alternative which has the largest of these values.
The third prototypical decision attitude is the so-called neutral decision
maker. In this case, we evaluate each using
Ci  1n
Xn
j1
Cij
and select the alternative which has the largest of these values.
The procedure used with these three decision attitudes is essentially the
same. We evaluate each alternative, based upon the available payos associ-
ated with that alternative,
Fi  F Ci1;Ci2;Ci3; . . . ;Cin
and then select the alternative with the largest Fi. The dierence between the
dierent cases is in the form of the function F which reflects the responsible
decision maker’s attitude.
3. Decision attitude and probabilities
Let us return to the case of decision making under risk. In this case, we have
associated with each Sj a probability, Prob(VSj)Pj. We recall that in this
case we used as a valuation function the expected value for each alternative,
Ei 
Pn
j1 PjCij; where Cij is the payo associated with the selection of Ai and
the value VSj. Once having determined Ei for each alternative, we select our
best alternative AI where is the alternative with the largest expected value
Ei Maxi Ei:
What is often overlooked when using the expected value to help determine
the best alternative is that the use of the expected value is implicitly associating
some decision making attitude with the responsible decision maker. Specifi-
cally, the use of the expected value associates a kind of neutral attitude to the
decision maker. What we are interested in doing in the following is to allow for
the possibility that the decision maker may have a decision attitude dierent
then that of being neutral. Here we must provide a mechanism for combining
probabilistic information about state of nature with information about the
decision maker’s attitude, with respect to their being optimistic/pessimistic
(adventurous/conservative).
In the following, we shall provide a mechanism for dealing with the pro-
totypical optimistic and pessimistic decision makers who also have probabi-
listic information about the state of nature. Thus here we can be seen as
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essentially combining the two paradigms found in the classical literature,
decision making under risk and decision making under ignorance. In the
following, we shall be guided by intuition, a more formal development of these
ideas is presented in subsequent sections.
Let us first consider the case of an optimistic decision maker. We recall that
in the situation of decision making under ignorance, where no information is
available about the uncertainty, an optimistic decision maker prefers alterna-
tives that have at least one good possible outcome, it evaluates alternatives by
Maxj[Cij]. A natural extension of this imperative to the case in which we have
probabilities associated with the state of nature is to model an optimistic de-
cision maker as one who prefers alternatives that have a chance of at least one
good outcome, where the higher probability the better. For an optimist believes
that if there is any chance of getting a good outcome, they will get it. With this
in mind, an optimistic evaluation of an alternative in the face of probabilistic
uncertainty is
Di MaxjPjCij:
Essentially then for each alternative, we calculate the degree to which there
exists an outcome which has a high probability and high payo.
We now turn to the case of the pessimistic decision maker. When no
probabilistic information is available, a pessimistic decision maker prefers al-
ternatives with no outcome which can give them a bad (low) payo, they
evaluate alternatives by Minj[Cij]. This approach focus on avoiding any pos-
sibility of getting a bad payo, for as pessimists they believe the worst will
happen. A natural extension of this attitude, to environments in which we have
probabilistic information, is to try avoid alternatives which have at least one
high probability outcome with a low payo. With this in mind, a pessimistic
evaluation in the face of probabilistic uncertainty is
Bi MinjPjCij  1ÿ Pj:
Essentially this imperative is one of preferring alternatives such that all out-
comes have either a high payo or low probability. Essentially this imperative is
the same as saying that an alternative is desirable if for all outcomes associated
with the alternative, if probability is high then payo is not low. A further un-
derstanding of this imperative for comparing alternatives can be had if we
consider the valuation function
B^i  1ÿMaxjPj1ÿ Cij:
Since it can be shown that 1ÿMaxjPj1ÿ Cij Minj Pj  Cij ÿ PjCij 
MinjPjCij  1ÿ Pj; we see that Bi and B^i are the same evaluation functions.
The formulation of B^i provides a nice intuitive understanding of the pessimists
imperative, the term Pj1ÿ Cij measures the concept probable and not good
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payo for the jth state of nature for alternative i. Since Maxj[Pj (1ÿCij)] returns
the largest of these scores we see that this evaluation is comparing the alter-
natives on the imperative of there not being a probable state of nature which
gives a low payo when choosing this alternative.
In the preceding, we have indicated evaluation functions for decision
making under the probabilistic knowledge for three dierent decision attitudes.
Let us look at performance of these evaluation functions for some special
probabilistic situations. First consider the case in which one of the outcomes
has probability one. Let us denote this as k, thus Pk  1. In this case we see that
Bi  Cik;
Ci  Cik;
Di  Cik;
and hence the evaluation of all alternatives by all methods is simply the payo
of that alternative for the state of nature with probable one. This is essentially
decision making under certainty.
Consider next the case when all outcomes have the same probability,
Pj  1=n. In this case, for the optimist,
Bi Maxj 1n Cij
 
 1
n
MaxjCij:
In this case the optimist orders the alternatives simply by their maximal payo,
this is essentially the same as if we had no probability information. For the
neutral attitude decision maker we get
Ci  1n
Xn
j1
Cij:
We here again see that this is exactly the same imperative used in the case when we
have no probabilistic information. Finally, for the case of the pessimist, we get
Di Minj 1n Cij

 1

ÿ 1
n

:
In this case we see that the Di are ordered by the Minj[Cij], which is again the
same as the case of when we have no probabilistic information. Thus we see
that in the case of equal probabilities for all outcomes, the three methods act as
their non-probabilistic counterparts.
Attitude Evaluation Function
Optimist Bi MaxjPjCij
Neutral Ci 
Pn
j1PjCij
Pessimist Di MinjPjCij  Pj
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A reasonable property that one wants to associate with a decision making
technique is that of Pareto optimality, if we have two alternatives A1 and A2
where for all states of nature the payo for A1 is at least as large as the payo
for A2 then A1 should be preferred to A2.
The following theorem indicates all three methods of evaluation satisfy this
condition.
Theorem. All three methods for attitudinal decision making under probability
exhibit Pareto optimality.
Proof. Assume the aj are the payos for alternative A for the dierent states of
nature and let a^j those for alternative A^. We assume aj > a^j for all j. If
B MaxjPjaj and B^ MaxjPja^j;
then it is clear that B P B^. Similarly if C Pnj1 pja^j and C^ Pnj1 pja^j then it
is clear that C P C^. Finally if
D MinjajPj  Pj and D^ MinjajPj  Pj;
then it is clear that D P D^:
4. Generalized alternate decision making under ignorance
In Ref. [3] Yager suggested an approach to decision making under ignorance
which generalizes the classic cases of optimist, pessimist and neutral as well as
other cases such as the Hurwicz. The approach suggested in Ref. [3] allows for
an infinite variety of dierent decision making attitudes. This approach is based
on the use of ordered weighted averaging OWA operator [9]. Our goal here is
to use some recent results on the inclusion of importance [10,11] in the OWA
aggregation procedure to provide for an extension of this general attitudinal
approach to decision making to environments in which we additional have
probabilities information over the possible states of nature.
We begin by describing the OWA operator, an aggregation operator which
plays a central role in this general attitudinal/probabilistic approach to decision
making under uncertainty. More details about this aggregation operator can be
found in Refs. [9,12].
Definition. An OWA operator of dimension n is a mapping F : Rn ! R which
has an associated weighting vector:
W 
w1
w2
..
.
wn
26664
37775
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in which
1. wj 2 0; 1;
2.
Pn
j1
wj  1;
where F a1; a2; . . . ; an 
Pn
j1 wjbj with bj being the jth largest of the ai.
The key feature of this approach is the ordering of the arguments by value, a
process that introduces a nonlinearity into the operation. It can be shown that
the operator is in the class of mean operators as it is commutative, monotone
and idempotent. It also can be shown that for any weighing vector
W ; Miniai 6 F a1; a2; . . . ; an 6 Maxiai: The generality of this operator lies
in the fact that by selecting the weights W we can implement dierent aggre-
gation operators.
In Ref. [3] Yager suggested using the OWA operator to obtain the evalua-
tion for the dierent alternatives in the case of decision making under igno-
rance. In particular, it was suggested that we use as our evaluation function for
alternative Ai the formulation Ri  FW Ci1;Ci2; . . . ;Cin where FW is an OWA
aggregation function with weighting vector W. We then would select as the best
alternative the one with the largest Ri. By choosing dierent weighting vectors
we can implement dierent decision making attitudes. Because of this, the
vector W is called the attitudinal vector. A number of special cases of this
attitudinal vector are worth pointing out
When WW, where
W  
1
0
0
..
.
0
266664
377775 ;
we get
Ri MaxjCij:
This is the evaluation function used by the optimist.
When WW, where
W 
1
0
0
..
.
0
266664
377775 ;
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we get
Ri MinjCij
which is the evaluation function used by the pessimist.
If WWN where
WN 
1
n
1
n
1
n
..
.
1
n
2666664
3777775 ;
we get
Ri  1n
Xn
j1
Cij
which is the evaluation function used by the neutral decision maker.
If we select W such that w1  a and wn  1ÿ a; then we get
Ri  a MaxjCij  1ÿ aMinjCij
which is the so-called Hurwicz criteria, we shall denote this as WH . Thus we see
that using this OWA based approach we are able to model the classic types of
approaches to attitudinal decision making which in addition introducing the
possibility of an infinite variety of other possible aggregation imperatives.
In order to help classify the attitude associated with a particular selection of
attitudinal vector W, Yager [9] developed a measure associated with any weigh-
ing vector W called the measure of optimism. Assume W is an OWA weighting
of dimension n then the measure optimism associated with W is defined as
OptW   1
nÿ 1
Xn
j1
nÿ j wj ;
where wj is the jth component in W. It can be easily seen that this lies in the
unit interval. The larger the value the optimist the aggregation. In respect it can
be shown that
OptW   1;
OptWN   0:5;
OptW  0;
OptWH   a :
Generally as more of the weights are located near the top, the more optimistic
the weighting vector, while moving weight to the bottom of W makes it more
pessimistic.
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Another measure introduced in Ref. [9] associated with the OWA weighting
vector is called the measure of dispersion or entropy. This measure is defined as
DispW   ÿ
Xn
j1
Wj lnwj:
In Ref. [9] it was suggested that this measures the degree to which we use all the
information contained in the argument of an OWA aggregation. For example,
consider the three examples of weighting vectors of dimension 5
W 
0
0
1
0
0
266664
377775; W^ 
0:5
0
0
0
0:5
266664
377775; ^^W 
0:2
0:2
0:2
0:2
0:2
266664
377775:
All three of these have the same degree of optimism, 0.5, that is they are es-
sentially doing the same kind of aggregation. However, these three vectors are
distinguished from each other in regard to the measure of dispersion,
Disp ^^W  > DispW^  > DispW :
We see that if we use W, we base our aggregation only on one argument, the
median. If we use, W^ , we base our aggregation on only two arguments,
the biggest and the smallest. On the other hand, if we use ^^W , we use all the
arguments. Thus we see that ^^W clearly uses more information in the formu-
lation of the aggregated value. We can see that Disp is essentially a measure of
the information used in the aggregation. We recall this formulation is the
Shannon [13] measure of entropy.
O’Hagan [14,15] suggested calling the weighting vector that has the maximal
entropy (Disp) for a given degree of optimism a the Maximum Entropy-OWA
weights. As an acronym we shall refer to these as the ME-OWA weights.
Furthermore, O’Hagan suggested that we can find the associated ME-OWA
weighting vector of dimension n for a given degree of optimism a by solving the
following mathematical programming problem for w1;w2; . . . ;wn:
such that
maximize
Pn
j1
Wj lnwj
1 1nÿ 1
Pn
j1
nÿ jwj  a;
2Pn
j1
wj  1;
3 wj 2 0; 1:
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Thus for each value of a, the above mathematical programming problem
gives us a dierent weighting vector W. We note that if a 1, we get W, if
a 0.5, we get WN and if a 0, we get W.
In Ref. [3], using the above ideas Yager suggested a simple yet general ap-
proach to decision making under ignorance. The responsible decision maker is
asked to provide a value a 2 [0, 1] indicating the degree of optimism they want
to use in the problem. Then inserting this value in the preceding mathematical
programming we find the ME-OWA weights giving us an attitudinal weighting
vector W. We then use this weighting vector in the OWA aggregation function
FW Ci1;Ci2; . . . ;Cin used to evaluate each of the alternatives. It is worth
pointing out that this approach only requires that the decision maker provide
the single parameter a to characterize their decision attitude.
5. General attitudinal decision making with probabilities
In the preceding section we considered the problem of attitudinal decision
making under ignorance. There we showed that for a particular alternative Ai,
its evaluation, Ri, is obtained as
Ri  FW Ci1;Ci2; . . . ;Cin;
where the Cij are payos associated with that alternative and FW is an OWA
operator with weighting vector W. As noted W is a reflection of the attitude of
the responsible decision maker.
In this section, we shall extend these results and consider a general approach
to the problem of including decision making attitude in situations where
probabilistic information about the state of nature is available. Thus we shall
assume that associated with each of the n possible states of nature Sj is a value
Pj indicating the probability that this will be the actual value of the state of
nature, it is of course assume that
Pn
j1 Pj  1. In addition we shall assume
that the responsible decision maker has a decision attitude captured by a
weighting vector W. Thus for a given alternative, Ai, associated with each state
of nature Sj is a pair (Pj, Cij), its probability of occurrence and the associated
payo under the selection of this alternative. As noted earlier the probabilities
can be viewed as weights associated with each of the possible payos. Using the
OWA evaluation function FW which captures the decision attitude gives us for
a given alternative
Ri  FW P1;Ci1; P2;Ci2; . . . ; Pn;Cin:
Here we must obtain the OWA aggregation of pairs, the payos and their
weights, the associated probabilities.
Yager [11] investigated the problem of OWA aggregation of pairs of the type
described above. In Ref. [11] it was suggested that each of the pairs (Pj, Cij) be
transformed into a single eective value eij and then these eective values can
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then be aggregated using the regular OWA aggregation technique. However, as
noted in Ref. [11], the form of the transformation which takes the pairs into the
single value depends upon the type of OWA aggregation, the form of the at-
titudinal vector W. It was shown [11] that this dependency can be simply re-
lated to the degree of ‘‘optimism’’, a, of the weighting vector. In Ref [11], using
fuzzy system modelling a formula was constructed for the transformation of
these pairs into eective values. In the following, we summarize the approach.
Our problem is to calculate
Ri  FW P1;Ci1; P2;Ci2; . . . ; Pn;Cin;
where W is an OWA vector indicating the decision making attitude. The fol-
lowing is the suggested procedure:
1. Calculate the degree of optimism a associated with the vector W.
a  1
nÿ 1
Xn
j1
nÿ jwj :
2. Transformation of each of the pairs (Pj, Cij) into an eective value eij where
eij 
2an PjCij  1ÿ 2a Pj  PjCij for a < 0:5;
PjCij2aÿ 1  n2ÿ 2a for a P 0:5:
(
3. Evaluate Ri  FW ei1; ei2; . . . ; ein:
It is interesting to provide an alternative formulation for eij in the case when
a < 0:5. First we note that  Pj  PjCij  1ÿ 1  Pj  PjCij  1ÿ ÿ Pjÿ
PjCij  1  1ÿ ÿ Pj ÿ PjCij  Pj  Pj  1ÿ ÿPjCij  Pj  1ÿ Pj1ÿ Cij.
Hence we can use
eij  2anPjCij  1ÿ 2a1ÿ Pj1ÿ Cij:
The following example illustrates the procedure described above.
Example. Consider the following decision matrix
S1 S2 S3 S4
A1 1 0:2 0:6 0:4
A2 0:5 0 0:9 0:6
We shall assume the following probabilities
P1  0:3; P2  0:2; P3  0:1 and P4  0:4:
In addition we shall assume decision makers attitude is captured by the fol-
lowing vector
W 
0:1
0:2
0:3
0:4
2664
3775:
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The responsible decision maker is somewhat pessimistic, most of the weight is
near the bottom.
We first calculate the degree of optimism associated with this vector
a  1
3
30:1  20:2  0:31  00:4  0:333:
We now calculate the transformation of the pairs, since a is less than 0.5 we use
as our transformation function
eij  2anPjCij  1ÿ 2a Pj  PjCij:
Putting in the values n 4 and a 1/3 we get
eij  23 4PjCij  13  Pj  PjCij:
Using this formula we obtain for the transformed values
e11  1:13; e12  0:39; e13  0:48 and e14  0:68;
e21  0:68; e22  0:27; e23  0:57 and e24  0:92:
To obtain R1 we calculate
R1  Fw1:13; 0:39; 0:48; 0:68
and using the OWA aggregation we get
R1  0:11:13  0:20:68  0:30:48  0:40:39  0:549:
To obtain R2 we calculate
R2  Rw0:68; 0:27; 0:57; 0:92
and therefore
R2  0:920:1  0:20:68  0:30:57  0:40:27  0:507:
From these, we see that A1 is the preferred alternative.
Let us investigate the properties of this approach. First we show that this
general approach reduces to the three prototypical cases introduced earlier. If
we have a pure optimistic attitude, W then a 1 and we get
eij  PjCij
and thus
Ri MaxiPjCij:
This is the same form as the one suggested in the earlier section for the opti-
mist. If we have a purely pessimistic attitude, W, then a 0 and we get
eij  Pj  PjCij
and thus
Ri Minj P  PjCij:
Again this is the form suggested earlier for the pessimist with probabilistic
information. If we have a risk neutral decision maker, WN , then a 0.5 and
eij  nPjCij
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and this gives us
Ri 
Xn
j1
PjCij
the usual expected value.
It is interesting to consider the Hurwicz case, here we recall
W  WH 
a
0
..
.
0
1ÿ a
266664
377775:
From this we see that the valuation function, Ri, in this Hurwicz case is
Ri  a Maxjeij  1ÿ aMinjeij:
Furthermore it can be shown that in this case Opt(WH ) a. Therefore if
aP 0.5 then
eij  PjCij2aÿ 1  n2ÿ 2a
which gives as an evaluation for the ith alternative
Ri  2aÿ 1  n2ÿ 2aa MaxjPjCij  1ÿ aMinjPjCij:
Since 2aÿ 1  n2ÿ 2a is the same for all i, we get that the Ri are simply
ordered by
a MaxjPjCij  1ÿ aMinjPjCij;
which indicates the centrality of the term PjCij in the selection process.
If a < 0.5, then
eij  2anPjCij  1ÿ 2a1ÿ Pj1ÿ Cij;
eij  1ÿ 2a Pj  PjCij1 2anÿ 1:
Here the ordering of the eij is much more complex.
Let us now look at the results of using this approach for some special
probabilistic situations. Consider the special case when all the probabilities are
the same, Pi  1=n. We must consider two cases, when a < 0.5 and when
aP 0.5. If a < 0.5 then
eij  1ÿ 2a nÿ 1n 
1
n
Cij1 2anÿ 1:
Since a and n are fixed for a given problem and 1 2anÿ 1 is positive then
eij is just a simple linear transform of the Cij. Thus in this case the ordering
must be the same as if we did not include the probabilities. That is if R^i is the
evaluation of alternative Ai obtained by using the decision making under
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ignorance approach the evaluation Ri obtained using the above approach
will be
Ri  1ÿ 2a nÿ 1n 

2a 1
n
ÿ 2a
n

R^i:
Thus the relative ordering of the alternatives are the same.
If aP 0:5 we get
eij  1n Cij2aÿ 1  n2ÿ 2a
which again is a simple linear transformation of the Cij.
Consider now the special case when a state of nature has probability one. Let
us assume without loss of generality that P1 1 and Pj 0 for all j 6 1. Again
we must consider two cases, when a < 0.5 and when a P 0.5. If a < 0.5 then
ei1  Ci12aÿ 1  n2ÿ 2a;
eij  0 for j 6 1:
From this we see that the Ri are going to be ordered by the Ci1, the payos
associated with the state of nature with probability one. Thus the most pre-
ferred alternative will be the one with the highest Ci1 value, this is as desired. If
a < 0.5 then
ei1  Ci12an 1ÿ 2a;
eij  1ÿ 2a for j 6 1:
again we see that the Ri are ordered based upon the value of the Ci1, the payo
associated with the state of nature having probability one.
Using the preceding mechanism, we can provide a general approach to at-
titudinal decision making with probabilistic information requiring only a single
parameter to characterize the decision attitude, the degree of optimism of the
responsible decision maker. We shall denote this degree of optimism as a.
1. Using a generate the associated ME-OWA weighting vector Wa.
2. Transform each of the Pj;Cij pairs into their associated eij value.
3. Perform the OWA aggregation
Ri  FWaei1; ei2; . . . ; ein:
4. Select as the preferred alternative the one with the largest Ri value.
6. Attitudinal decision making with belief structure
In the preceding section we have considered two conditions with respect to
our knowledge of the state of nature, ignorance or the availability of a prob-
ability distribution. Recently authors have considered another structure with
respect to the knowledge of the state of nature, a more general one, called a
Dempster–Shafer (D–S) belief structure [6]. These belief structures allow for
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representations of states of knowledge that lie between the two classic cases.
The cases of pure ignorance and a classic probability distribution can be seen
as extreme special cases of these structures. In the following we shall extend the
ideas of the preceding to this knowledge environment.
Let V be the variable corresponding to the state of nature. Assume V takes
its value in the set X the possible states of nature. A belief structure over V
consists of a collection of m non-empty subsets of X, Bk for k 1 to m, called
focal elements and an associated set of weights, P(Bk), such that
1: P BkP 0 for k  1 to m;
2:
Pm
k1
PBk  1:
One semantics that can be associated with this structure is one in which P(Bk) is
the probability that the actual state of nature is selected from among those
possibilities found in Bk.
In Ref. [3], we suggested an approach to the problem of selecting an optimal
alternative in this case of having our knowledge about the state of nature in the
form of a D-S belief structure. This approach requires that the responsible de-
cision maker provide a value a 2 0; 1 indicating their degree of optimism, one
of course is the pure optimist and zero is the pure pessimist. The approach de-
scribed in Ref. [3] involves the calculation for each alternative of a valuation
based upon the possible payos for that alternative, the belief structure asso-
ciated with the state of nature and the value a. Once having the valuations for
each of the alternatives, we then select as the preferred alternative the one with
the highest valuation. In the following, we describe the procedure suggested in
Ref. [3] for the calculation of the valuation Vi associated with the ith alternative.
1. For each focal element Bk obtain Mik, the collection of payos for alterna-
tive i corresponding to the states of nature lying in Bk.
2. For each Mik calculate its valuation Vik using the decision making under ig-
norance procedure with degree of optimism a
Vik  FWaMik:
We recall FWa is an OWA aggregation where the weights are the ME-OWA
weights under a and its argument is the elements in Mik.
3. Calculate the valuation of alternative Ai, Vi, as
Vi 
Xm
k1
VikP Bk:
The following example illustrates the calculation of the valuation function.
Example. Assume our basic data is
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
A1 0:7 0:9 1 0:3 0:6
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We shall assume a degree of optimism of a 0.75 for the responsible decision
maker. Let our belief structure have focal elements
B1  fS1; S3; S4g
B2  fS2; S5g
B3  fS1; S2; S3; S4; S5g
and the associated weights be
P B1  0:6; P B2  0:3 and P B3  0:1:
In this case
M11  f0:7; 1; 0:3g;
M12  f0:9; 0:6g;
M13  f0:7; 0:9; 1; 0:3; 0:6g:
For a 0.75, the ME-OWA weights associated with aggregations of cardi-
nalities 2, 3 and 5 are shown below:
In this case
V11  0:521  0:270:7  0:110:3  0:842;
V12  0:750:9  0:260:6  0:825;
V13  0:461  0:260:9  0:150:7  0:080:6  0:050:3
 0:862:
Finally, V1  (0.6)(0.842) + (0.3)(0.825) + (1)(0.862)  0.839.
Three special cases of the above approach are worth pointing out. If a 1,
an optimistic decision maker, then WaW and Vik is always the largest value
in Mik, we shall denote this as Max[Mik]. Hence in this case the overall valu-
ation is
Vi 
Xm
k1
MaxMikPBk:
Thus Vi is the expected value of the largest value associated with each of the
focal elements.
If a 0, a purely pessimistic decision maker, then WaW and Vik is always
the smallest value in Mik, we shall denote this as Min[Mik]. Hence in this case
the overall valuation is
Vi 
Xm
k1
MinMikP Bk:
No. of Arguments w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
2 0.75 0.25
3 0.62 0.27 0.11
5 0.46 0.26 0.15 0.08 0.05
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Thus Vi is the expected value of the smallest elements associated with each of
focal elements.
If a 0.5 then the ME-OWA weights Wa are such that Vik becomes the
average of the elements in Mik, we shall denote this as Av[Mik], hence
Vi 
Xm
k1
AvMikP Bk;
the expected value of these averages.
We note that in step two of the algorithm, the calculation of the Vik, we use
the decision maker’s attitude, a, since Vik  FWaMik: Essentially this step can
be seen as an example of the process used for decision making under ignorance.
In step three, however, where we are aggregating the Vik in the face of prob-
abilistic uncertainty, the P(Bk), we are simply using the expected value, no
consideration is being taken of the decision maker’s attitude in this step. In the
light of the preceding work, it would seen natural to generalize this procedure
by taking the decision attitude a into the process of calculating Vi from the
P(Bk) and Vik. Thus we can more generally calculate
Vi  FWaP B1; Vi1; P B2; Vi2; . . . ; P Bm; Vim;
where Wa is an OWA vector of dimension m, the number of focal elements,
whose components are the ME-OWA weights obtained under degree of opti-
mism a.
Three special cases are worth noting. For a 1, the pure optimist, the ME-
OWA vector is W and hence we get that
Vi MaxkMaxMikPBk:
For a 0, the pure pessimist, the ME-OWA vector is W and hence we get
Vi MinkMinMikP Bk  1ÿ P Bk:
For a 0.5, the ME-OWA weights are all equal for all j and hence we get
Vi 
Xm
k1
AvMikP Bk:
In the following example, we shall use these three approaches, optimistic,
pessimistic and neutral, to compare two alternatives in the face of knowledge
contained in a belief structure.
Example.
S1 S2 S3 S4 S5
A1 0:7 0:2 1 0:4 0:6
A2 0:6 0:5 0:7 0:2 0:1
We shall assume the knowledge about the state of nature is captured by the
belief structure with focal elements
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B1  fS1; S2; S3g;
B2  fS2; S5g;
B3  fS1; S2; S3; S4; S5g;
associated weights
P B1  0:6; P B2  0:3 and P B3  0:1:
In this example
M11  f0:7; 0:2; 1g;
M12  f0:2; 0:6g;
M13  f0:7; 0:2; 1; 0:4; 0:6g;
and
M21  f0:6; 0:5; 0:7g;
M22  f0:5; 1g;
M23  f0:6; 0:5; 0:7; 0:2; 1g:
(I) Pure optimist, a 1:
Vik MaxMik
Vi MaxkVikP Bk:
(i) Alternative A1:
V11  1; V12  0:6; V13  1;
V1 Max0:6; 0:18; 0:1  0:6:
(ii) Alternative A2:
V21  0:7; V22  1; V23  1;
V2 Max0:42; 0:3; 0:1  0:42:
Hence in the case of the pure optimist A1 is preferred.
(II) Pure pessimist, a 0:
Vik MinMik;
Vi MinkVikP Bk  1ÿ P Bk:
(i) Alternative A1:
V11  0:2; V12  0:2; V13  0:2;
V1 Min0:52; 0:76; 0:92  0:52:
(ii) Alternative A2:
V21  0:5; V22  0; 5; V23  0:2;
V2 Min0:7; 0:85; 0:92  0:7:
Hence A2 is preferred by the pure pessimist.
(III) Neutral, a  0.5:
Vik  AvMik;
Vi 
P3
k1
VikP Bk:
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(i) Alternative A1:
V11  0:63; V12  0:4; V13  0:58;
V1  0:556:
(ii) Alternative A2:
V21  0:6; V22  0:75; V23  0:6;
V2  0:645:
Hence in the case when a 0.5, A2, is the preferred alternative.
7. Conclusion
We have focused on the construction of evaluation functions to compare
alternatives in decision making under uncertainty. The importance of the de-
cision makers attitude with respect to their view of the nature of uncertainty
was stressed as a significant component in the formulation of these functions.
Evaluation functions have been developed which allow for the inclusion of
both probabilistic information about possible outcomes as well as attitudinal
predilections held by the decision maker.
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